Source Currency:Issue 48 May 2026 The Building Safety Act 2022 is now creating significant interest for construction lawyers. In this issue, we look at a number of judgments that explore remediation and related issues. One seminal judgment is Crest Nicholson Regeneration Ltd v Ardmore Construction Ltd [2026] EWHC 789 (TCC), where the Technology and Construction Court granted the claimants, application for building liability orders (BLOs) pursuant to ss 130-131 of the Building Safety Act 2022 (BSA 2022), holding that it was just and equitable to make both an anticipatory BLO and an adjudication BLO against the fourth to tenth defendants (BLO defendants). The court held that any liability that Ardmore Construction Ltd (ACL), now in administration, may have to the claimants under s 1 of the Defective Premises Act 1972 or as a result of a building safety risk is also the joint and several liability of each of the BLO defendants. The court further held that the BLO defendants are jointly and severally liable for sums owed by ACL under an adjudicator,s decision dated 29 August 2025 awarding approximately $ 14.9 million. The court concluded that an adjudicator,s decision can constitute a 'relevant liability' for BSA 2022 purposes, rejecting arguments that adjudication's interim nature rendered it incompatible with BLOs. The court found that ACL's administration was driven by exposure to cladding defect claims following Grenfell Tower, that the Ardmore Group had been restructured to ringfence ACL's liabilities, and that ultimate control rested with Cormac Byrne. The court held there was a high degree of confidence that the development contained building safety risks and that ACL would be liable. The court rejected arguments that uncertainty around quantum, comparative profits, or the BLO defendants 2019; financial position precluded making anticipatory BLOs, finding these factors carried little weight in the just and equitable assessment. This judgment has impact too for statutory adjudication. The UK Supreme Court rarely hands down judgments that impact the drafting of construction contracts. We report Providence Building Services Ltd v Hexagon Housing Association Ltd UKSC/2024/0130, where the Supreme Court dismissed the contractor&'s case and allowed the appeal holding that the contractor was not entitled to terminate the contract under clause 8.9 of the JCT Design and Build Contract 2016, where the employer had paid late on two occasions, but the first late payment was remedied within the contractual 28-day period for curing defaults. The sole issue of contractual interpretation was whether the contractor could terminate its employment under clause 8.9.4 of the 2016 edition of the JCT Design and Build Contract in a case where a right to give the further notice referred to in clause 8.9.3 had never previously accrued. The employer argued that the contract only entitled the contractor to terminate for a second late payment if the first late payment had not ultimately been made within 28 days of its due date, and in the present case, the first late payment had been paid within 28 days. The Supreme Court ruled that the objective natural meaning of the words in clause 8.9.4, in the context of clause 8.9, appeared to be parasitic on clause 8.9.3 rather than being independent of it, requiring a previously accrued right to terminate. That interpretation produced a rational and less extreme outcome than the interpretation contended for by the contractor on the basis that his suggested interpretation rendered the opening words of clause 8.9.4 superfluous. The court held that the rational consequence was that it was only where the earlier breach (for which a specified notice of default was given by the contractor) went uncured for 28 days, and was in that sense particularly serious, that the contractor could terminate immediately for a further late payment. Accordingly, the court held that the contractor could not terminate its employment under clause 8.9.4 of the JCT 2016 Design and Build Form where a right to give the further notice referred to in clause 8.9.3 had never previously accrued. I also highlight Eiger Funding (PCC) Ltd v Ridge & Partners LLP [2026] EWHC 609 (TCC). Here, the court ruled that the claimant Eiger Funding (PCC) Limited succeeded in its professional negligence claim against the defendant Ridge and Partners LLP. The proceedings concerned a $12.9 million loan made by Eiger in November 2018 to Signature Living Residential Limited for a Liverpool development project. The court ruled that Ridge owed contractual and tortious duties to exercise reasonable skill and care in advising on the adequacy of the contract sum, risks of cost overrun, completion risks, and costs to complete. Ridge breached these duties by failing to advise that there was significant risk that substantial costs would be incurred over and above those put forward by Signature, with Report 16 being confusing and unsatisfactory. Ridge failed to provide proper analysis of construction costs, accepted inadequate information from Signature, and did not advise that costs might exceed circa $12.5-13.5 million based on BCIS benchmarking. The court also found that Ridge had also breached a duty regarding the relationship issue by failing to explain the conversion from fixed price to a target cost contract and its risk implications. Ridge acted in conflict of interest by 'marking their own homework' having prepared the 2015 Cost Appraisals, without obtaining informed consent as required by RICS guidance. The court found causation established as Eiger relied upon Report 16 in entering the loan agreement, which was a condition precedent. This was a 'distressed asset' case where loss was suffered immediately upon entering the agreement containing significant undisclosed risks. Damages were awarded at $2.5 million, representing the difference between Ridge's advised costs to complete of circa $ 2.9 million and the likely market price of $.416 million based on BCIS benchmarking. In the context of statutory adjudication, this issue looks at: Darchem Engineering Ltd v Bouygues Travaux Publics [2026] EWHC 220 (TCC), where the court found that clause 11.2(11) of the conditions of subcontract explicitly defined 'Parties' as the Contractor and the Subcontractor demonstrating that absent such deeming language, 'Party' referred to the joint venture entity itself. The agreement's statement that 'All of the above are together known as the "Parties" was construed as meaning the four entities together constituted two Parties, consistent with the bilateral drafting throughout. The enforcement application failed. Paragon Group Ltd v FK Facades Ltd [2026] EWHC 78 (TCC) which looked at adjudication commenced by an assignee. The contractor challenged enforcement on the basis that (i) the assignee did not have any right to refer a dispute to adjudication, and/or (ii) the dispute referred did not arise under the contract. The court found that on a proper interpretation of the adjudication provisions of the JCT contract and Part I of the Scheme for Construction Contracts, the assignee did have the right to refer a dispute to adjudication, and the dispute referred was one which arose under the contract. The court was content that an assignee 'stands in the shoes of' the assignor.In terms of dispute resolution procedure, we highlight Kevin Demirci Properties Ltd v Huw Griffiths Architects Ltd [2026] EWHC 353 (TCC), where the court dismissed the defendant's application to strike out the claimant's claim and refused permission to bring contempt proceedings against the claimant's director, Mr Demirci. The claimant, a property company, claimed professional negligence against the defendant, an architectural firm, alleging incompetent design and advice concerning a student accommodation development in Swansea. The Particulars of Claim contained a false allegation that the claimant had entered into a joint venture agreement with Sir Robert McAlpine, pleading losses exceeding $13.5 million. This false fact had been included through chaos and incompetence in the drafting process conducted by Barrister M, the claimant's then legal representative, authorised to conduct litigation. The court found that whilst the false allegation was highly material, there was no intention by Mr Demirci to assert false facts; rather, the inclusion resulted from Barrister M's failures to properly read instructions, make appropriate inquiries, and obtain proper confirmation before signing the statement of truth on behalf of the claimant. The court declined to strike out the claim, finding this would not be a just and proportionate response where the false fact could be corrected by amendment and the defendant compensated in costs. The court also rejected the defendant's alternative strike-out application based on alleged lack of privity of contract, finding this raised disputed factual issues unsuitable for summary determination. The court granted the claimant permission to amend its Particulars of Claim extensively, removing the false allegation and providing necessary particularisation, and confirmed the claimant could instruct a different architect expert. The court expressed concerns about Barrister M's professional conduct warranting investigation by the Bar Standards Board.
Dr Hamish Lal
General Editor
Partner, Hamish Lal Partners
Hamish.lal@hamishlalpartners.com