Bankruptcy Disposal of property. The Chancery Division granted the applicant trustees in the bankruptcy of the first respondent relief under of the Insolvency Act 1986 after he had transferred his minority shares in a company to the second respondent following the presentation of a bankruptcy petition. The respondents had argued that the monetary relief sought by the trustees was unprecedented where the asset, namely the shares, had been returned and that the trustees had failed to plead or prove actual loss. The court held that the trustees had not been not required to plead actual loss and that the second to the fifth respondents had not acted in god faith and were jointly liable for the loss caused, namely the devaluation of the shares. The court held that the trustees were entitled to relief in the form of a fair value of the shares as at the date of the transfers.
*Hosking and another (as joint liquidators of Hellas Telecommunications (Luxembourg) II SCA) v Slaughter and May
Company Winding up. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, held that in respect of administrations that had commenced on or before 5 April 2010, the administrators could agree to pay and pay the fees of the solicitors' firm both before and after the end of the administration. If the liquidators did not agree with the fees that had been paid, they could bring misfeasance proceedings against the administrators. The and the Insolvency Rules provided ways in which liquidators could challenge the decision of an administrator to pay legal fees, but they did not provide a means by which liquidators could require the assessment of costs paid in an earlier administration.
Bankruptcy Trustee in bankruptcy. The Chancery Division held that of the Insolvency Act 1986 applied to the defendant bankrupt's self-invested personal pension (the SIPP), in respect of which he had elected to drawdown. It held that, as the bankrupt had elected to receive income from his drawdown fund each year up to a certain limit,he had 'become entitled', within meaning of s 310 of the Act, to the maximum sum which he had elected to drawdown from his SIPP. Accordingly, an income payments order was made. However, the court allowed for payment of the bankrupt's reasonable domestic needs. It held that, in respect of an undrawn pension, Horton v Henry All ER (D) 193 (Dec) was plainly correct. A bankrupt was not 'entitled' to a payment if there were elections still to be made as to how to apply pension funds and the mere existence of a drawdown fund was not enough to establish an 'entitlement'.
Bankruptcy Privilege. The Chancery Division ruled that the claimant's trustees in the bankruptcy had acquired the benefit of his legal professional privilege with respect to one of three categories of documents held by the second defendant solicitors, who were also acting for the claimant's creditor (A). Both A and the claimant had been engaged in hostile litigation. In all the circumstances, no order was granted requiring the solicitors to cease acting for the trustees. However, an injunction was granted requiring the solicitors to cease acting for A.
Insurance Transfer of long-term insurance business. The Companies Court granted an order, among other things, sanctioning an insurance business transfer scheme to transfer the applicant company, The Copenhagen Reinsurance Company (U.K) Ltd's entire insurance business to another company in the Enstar group.
Bankruptcy Property available for distribution. The Bankruptcy High Court allowed an application for relief by trustees in the bankruptcy of DD, who had made his living from residential and commercial property and was indebted to around the sum of 2.8m. The court held that money in certain accounts belonged to DD, that a flat which had been purchased out of money from one of the accounts was a bankruptcy asset, and that the transfer of shares in a company controlled by DD had been a sham.
Contract Construction. The Chancery Division, Companies Court dismissed the employer's application for an injunction to restrain the contractor from presenting a winding up petition on the basis that the contractor had followed the procedure set out in the contract and there was no doubt concerning the liability of the employer to make the interim payments claimed in applications.
Company Liquidation. The Chancery Division considered an application by the joint liquidators of Longmeade Ltd for directions, pursuant to of the Insolvency Act 1986 in relation to a potential claim in negligence, which they had identified could be made by the company against the Secretary of State for Business Innovation and Skills. Consideration was given to the principles to be applied to the modified regime concerning the commencement of proceedings by a company in compulsory liquidation post-26 May 2015.
Conflict of laws Jurisdiction. The Privy Council allowed an appeal arising out foreign insolvency proceedings concerning a company owned by Bernard Madoff. The trustee in bankruptcy of the company had sought to enforce a default judgment obtained in New York against the appellant company in Gibraltar, where it held substantial assets. The trustee's application for summary judgment was allowed in part by the Court of Appeal of Gibraltar, which ruled that the trustee's claim that the appellant had agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the state of New York had a reasonable prospect of success. The Privy Council, allowing the appellant's appeal, held that, on the facts, there was no basis for the assertion that there was a contractual term that the appellant had submitted to the New York jurisdiction. It held that an agreement to submit to a jurisdiction of a foreign court did not have to be contractual in nature and might be implied as a matter of fact, or by law. In any event, even if a jurisdiction agreement was to be implied, it would not apply to the present avoidance proceedings.
Land charge General equitable charge. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, in dismissing the appellant's appeal, held that the present was not a case in which 'tacking' arose, and the second respondent retained its priority as first chargee in respect of an advance made by it in October 2006. There had been no new or further advance in or following March 2009, nor anything which the law would deem to have been a new or further advance, nor any agreement that the second respondent should be treated as having made a new advance.