Costs Assessment. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, dismissed the appellants' appeal against a costs order. The judge had not erred in principle, and had acted within his discretion. There was no reason for the court to interfere with the judgment and every reason why it ought not to.
Costs Order for costs. In allowing the appellant's appeal, the Court of Appeal confirmed that the appellant's unsuccessful claim brought against the Motor Insurers' Bureau for personal injuries was subject to the provisions under CPR44, namely, the Qualified One-Way Costs Shifting regime. Accordingly, the judge in the substantive hearing had erred when he enforced a costs order against the appellant.
Practice Pre-trial or post-judgment relief. The appellant had a reasonable prospect of establishing a duty of care in respect of the DVLA to use the special delivery self-addressed envelope provided by him for the return of his passport, when deciding whether to grant an adjournment under CPR 39. In reaching that decision, the Court of Appeal also found that the judge had erred in focussing on whether the appellant was physically capable of attending court on the day of trial. In doing so the judge had failed to examine all the evidence relevant to the non-attendance of the appellant.
Practice Service outside jurisdiction. Mere delay or expense could not constitute a sufficient reason for ordering alternative service within the jurisdiction in a case in which the defendant was resident in a Hague Service Convention country. So held the Chancery Division in respect of a third party's appeal against the dismissal of his application to set aside an order granting the claimant permission, under CPR 6.15, to serve an application for a third party costs order by an alternative method within the jurisdiction, in circumstances where the third party lived outside the jurisdiction.
Practice Striking out. As the first judge had not applied a new sanction different from the strike out sanction imposed by an unless order, the second judge could not entertain a second application for relief from sanctions after the application before the first judge had failed, unless there had been a material change of circumstances. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal, Civil Division, struck out the respondents' appeals against the second judge's decision striking out their defences, as there had been no material change of circumstances.
Practice Civil litigation. The judge's approach in dismissing the defendants' application for relief from sanctions, concerning the late filing of their costs budget, had not involved errors of principle, and had not been wrong on the facts. The Chancery Division, in dismissing the defendants' appeal, held that the judge's conclusion had been open to him in the exercise of his discretion.
Damages Assessment. The uplift in Simmons v Castle should be applied to awards of compensation for injury to feelings and for psychiatric injury in discrimination cases in an employment tribunal and further on the facts of the case the Court of Appeal, Civil Division held that there should have been an uplift in the award made for breach of the ACAS code.
Damages Personal injury. The judge had erred in inferring that the claimant's injuries had resulted from a fire caused by the negligence of the defendant in circumstances where the evidence, including expert evidence, did not support that such an inference could be drawn. The Queen's Bench Division held that the present case had been a highly unusual case where there had been no known cause of the fire.
Practice Appeal. Although there had been a good reason for the applicants' delay in filing a transcript of the decision appealed against, their appeal was not arguable. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal, Civil Division, dismissed the applicants' application for review of the master's dismissal of their appeal against the dismissal of their judicial review claim because of their default in filing required documents
Practice Summary judgment. The Technology and Construction Court dismissed the claimant company's applications for summary judgment and an interim payment, in a dispute about work carried out under a construction contract. Among other things, the defendant company had established that it had a realistic rather than a fanciful prospect of successfully defending the claim, which caused the application for summary judgment to fail, and the court was not satisfied that the claimant would obtain judgment for a substantial amount of money, which caused the application for an interim payment to fail.