Immigration Exclusion of immigrant deemed to be conducive to the public good. The appellant Iranian national's appeal against a decision of the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) upholding the decision of the Secretary of State on the basis that there would not be very significant obstacles to the appellant's integration into Iran was dismissed by the Court of Appeal, Civil Division. It had been clear that the UT had undertaken a broad evaluation when having determined whether there were very significant obstacles to the appellant's integration into Iran and had reached a decision which it had been entitled to reach.
Immigration European Economic Area nationals. Regulation 18(4) of the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2016, , required that the passport accompanying or joined with the application for a residence card was the passport of the applicant, not their European Economic Area partner. As the claimant Pakistani national had failed to supply his passport or evidence that he had been unable to produce it due to circumstances beyond his control, the Administrative Court dismissed his application for judicial review and held that the defendant Secretary of State had not erred in refusing his application for a residence card.
MS and another v Secretary of State for the Home Department; Secretary of State for the Home Department v MS
Immigration Leave to remain. The appellants' challenge to the respondent Secretary of State's restricted leave policy governing the grant of leave to remain to asylum seekers whose claims had been refused because they had committed particularly serious offences or who were excluded from humanitarian protection, but whom it was impossible to remove, was rejected. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, further held that the appellants had properly been refused indefinite leave to remain.
Immigration Appeal. The First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (FTT) and the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (UT) made decisions against the deportation of the respondent Ghanaian national. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, in allowing the Secretary of State's appeal, held that, erroneously, weight had been given to a non-existent residence order and the FTT and UT had failed to take account of the potentially significant factor of a voluntary return by the respondent's family to Ghana or to consider or explain the weight to be attached to that factor. The case would be remitted to a freshly-constituted FTT for a re-hearing.
Immigration Leave to remain. The defendant Secretary of State made out her case that the claimant national of Botswana had previously used fraud to obtain leave to remain and her decision refusing the claimant indefinite leave to remain was unimpeachable. Accordingly, the Administrative Court dismissed the claimant's application for judicial review, finding that that deception was fatal to other grounds challenging the Secretary of State's decision.
R (on the application of FT) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (“rolling review”; challenging leave granted)
Immigration Leave to remain. In determining the duration of leave granted to the claimant Chinese national, a recognised victim of trafficking, the defendant Secretary of State had failed to consider material considerations, including her own mishandling of his case, the full circumstances surrounding the discontinuance of the claimant's therapy and the medical evidence. Accordingly, the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) allowed his application for judicial review.
*R (on the application of Kiarie) v Secretary of State for the Home Department; R (on the application of Byndloss) v Secretary of State for the Home Department)
Immigration Appeal. The appellants, who were foreign nationals with indefinite leave to remain in the United Kingdom, had been convicted of serious drug-related offences. In deciding to make deportation orders against them, the Secretary of State had issued certificates, the effect of which was that they could bring appeals against those orders only after they had returned to their respective home countries. In allowing their appeals against the issuing of those certificates, the Supreme Court held that the Secretary of State had failed to establish that such deportation had struck the fair balance required by art 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
Immigration Leave to remain. The Administrative Court dismissed the claimant's application for judicial review of the defendant Secretary of State's decision, refusing her application for indefinite leave to remain because, due to her father's deception, she had not been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for ten years. Neither a certificate of entitlement to the right of abode endorsed on her passport nor her British passport meant that she had been a citizen and the policy in Ch 55 of the Nationality Instructions did not apply.
Costs Order for costs. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, dismissed the appellant's appeal against a judge's refusal to award costs in respect of a judicial review claim challenging the lawfulness of continued detention. The appellant had successfully been released on bail in respect of proceedings he had brought prior to the judicial review proceedings, and, therefore, had succeeded in obtaining the substantive relief sought in the second claim. Accordingly, it was held that the judge had been correct to deny costs in the second claim as they were correctly deemed unnecessarily and unreasonably duplicative.
European Union Freedom of movement. The Court of Justice of the European Union gave a preliminary ruling in which it decided, among other things, that art 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union should be interpreted as meaning that for the purposes of assessing whether a child who was a Union citizen would be compelled to leave the territory of the EU as a whole and thereby deprived of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred on him by that article if the child's third-country national parent was refused a right of residence in the member state concerned, the fact that the other parent, who was a Union citizen, was actually able and willing to assume sole responsibility for the primary day-to-day care of the child was a relevant factor, but it was not in itself a sufficient ground for a conclusion that there was not, between the third-country national parent and the child, such a relationship of dependency that the child would indeed be so compelled were there to be such a refusal of a right of residence.