*Barclays Bank plc v Unicredit Bank AG and another

Guarantee Discharge of guarantee. German and Austrian banks entered guarantees with Barclays. The banks sought the early termination of the guarantees. Barclays refused consent unless the banks paid it five years' fees. It sought declarations that its refusal of consent had been commercially reasonable and that the guarantees had not been terminated. The Commercial Court, in granting the declarations, held that Barclays was acting reasonably in insisting on at least some element of profit.

Hughmans Solicitors v Central Stream Services Ltd (in liquidation) and others

Equity Beneficial interest. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, considered the issue of whether a Tomlin order directing the sale of a property and the payment of a fixed sum to a company created a proprietary interest in the property in favour of that company. Having found that it did, the Court then held that that interest took priority over a subsequent charging order on the property which had been obtained by the proprietor's former solicitors in respect of their unpaid legal fees. In reaching that decision the Court applied the basic rule as to priority in of the Land Registration Act 2002.

Relfo Ltd v Varsani

Costs Order for costs. The Chancery Division considered an application for the award of non-party costs against two non-parties to a claim, who were the father of the defendant and a businessman linked to the defendant's family. The court held that, given the close relationship between the non-parties and the defence of the claim, it was just and appropriate that non-party costs orders should be made against them.

*The Insight Group Ltd and another v Kingston Smith (a firm)

Practice Parties. The Queen's Bench Division considered whether when a claim was mistakenly brought against an LLP which ought to have been brought against the former partnership, and before the error was recognised the limitation period for starting a new action had expired, whether the error could be corrected by substituting the former partnership for the LLP as the defendant to the claim. The court held that in the instant case, the LLP had been named in the claim form in mistake for the firm within the meaning of CPR19.5(3)(a) and s35(6)(a) of the . Accordingly, there was power to substitute the defendant in relation to those claims which were not time-barred when the claim form was issued but had become so by 11 April 2011 when the order for substitution had been made. Further, the master had erred in principle in holding that substitution ought not to be ordered in the exercise of the court's discretion.

*Novoship (UK) Ltd and others v Mikhaylyuk and others

Equity Fiduciary duty. The claimants alleged that the first defendant, a former employee and director of the first claimant company, had, in breach of his fiduciary duties, dishonestly solicited and received bribes paid by or on behalf of various defendants during the course of his employment in connection with four areas of chartering business. The Commercial Court held that the claims had been made out in respect of various claimants. It further held that a dishonest assister of a fiduciary, who had diverted profit derived from the fiduciary's breach of duty, to an offshore company, which the assister owned and controlled, was accountable for the profits he had made.

*Thommes v Financial Services Authority

Financial services Financial Services Authority (FSA). The Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber) dismissed the reference by a former director of a company, challenging a decision notice by which the Financial Services Authority had informed the director of its decision pursuant to of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, to prohibit him from performing any controlled function involving the exercise of significant influence in relation to any regulated activity carried on by any authorised person, exempt person or exempt professional firm.

*Ollerenshaw and another v Financial Services Authority

Financial services Financial Services Authority (FSA). The Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber) ruled on a reference made to it by O and A, two senior officers of Black and White Group Ltd, which had specialised in arranging mortgages and associated insurance, in circumstances in which they challenged decisions of the Financial Services Authority making prohibition orders against them and imposing financial penalties on them for breach of, inter alia, Principles 1 and 6 of the FSA's Statements of Principles for Approved Persons.

*Mark Anthony Financial Management and another v Financial Services Authority

Financial Services Financial Services Authority (FSA). The Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber) gave reasons for its earlier decision that it was appropriate to impose a penalty of 150,000 on the applicants in circumstances where it had previously found that the applicants had submitted mortgage applications on his own behalf and, as its first applicant trading business on behalf of clients on several occasions and that the applications had contained false and misleading information which the second applicant either had known to be false or misleading or had been reckless as to whether such information had been true and complete.

Mukerjee and another v Sen and others

Partnership Profits. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, dismissed a defendant's appeal against an order to make an interim payment to the first claimant. The court had had jurisdiction to make the order and the case had fallen within one of the exceptions to the general rule that one partner was not accountable to another partner save only on the dissolution of the partnership and the taking of dissolution accounts.

Davies v Watkins

Trust and trustee Trustee's costs. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, in proceedings brought by the executor of an estate, held that a costs order in Beddoe proceedings had been wrong in law and the result of an implicit misdirection. It was declared that the claimant was entitled to an indemnity out of the estate for his costs of the Beddoe application, up to the date of a consent order.