Harvey v Dunbar Assets plc

Guarantee Construction. The claimant signed a guarantee, along with three others. The defendant bank sought to enforce the guarantee and obtained a statutory demand against the claimant. One of the other signatories to the guarantee contended that his name had been forged. The claimant appealed against a ruling allowing the statutory demand to stand. The Court of Appeal held that the guarantee had been subject to a condition that it would be signed by all the other intended guarantors named as such in the deed, and hence it could not be enforced against H and the statutory demand would be dismissed.

National Westminster Bank v Frankham

Pleading Striking out. The claimant bank issued proceedings to recover money lent to the defendant for a property development. The defendant sought to plead set off, as the bank had taken over management of the development and had caused her loss. The master had struck out the defence and counterclaim, and refused the defendant permission to amend them. On appeal, the Queen's Bench Division held that it was open to the defendant to set off against the bank's claim losses arising from the bank's breaches of duty in connection with the development. Accordingly, the master should have given limited permission to amend.

R v Druce

Sentence Confiscation order. The defendant had pleaded guilty to offences of money laundering and possession of criminal property. A confiscation order in the sum of 326,906.74 was subsequently made against the defendant. The defendant appealed stating that the figure had incorrectly included amounts not attributable to him. The Court of Appeal, Criminal Division in dismissing the appeal, held that the determination of the confiscation order had been neither unjust nor disproportionate.

*Re MF Global UK Ltd (in special administration)

Company Administration. Chapters 7 and 7A (CASS 7 and 7A) of the Client Assets Sourcebook section of the Financial Services Authority Handbook created a requirement for investment firms to segregate money received from or held for their clients and hold it on trust for them. In certain circumstances, including the administration or liquidation of the firm, the money held for clients (client money) had to be distributed among the clients, pro rata according to their entitlements. The administrators of a company which carried out business as broker-dealers in financial markets, sought the court's direction as to whether the client's money entitlement in respect of its position was to be valued as at the primary pooling event or by reference to the liquidation value (the hindsight principle). The Chancery Division, Companies Court, held that the hindsight principle was not applicable to the determination of claims to client money for the purposes of a distribution under CASS 7A.

Phoenix Life Assurance Ltd v The Financial Services Authority

Guarantee Pension guarantee. The claimant company applied to court for a declaration that, under its single premium policy (the freedom bond), guaranteed minimum pension guarantees would be covered by the total benefits under the bond. The Chancery Division held that the claimant's interpretation of the freedom bond was correct.

*Townrow v Financial Services Authority

Financial services Financial Services Authority (FSA). The Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber) struck out the reference made by a partner or sole principal in a firm in relation to the decision notice issued by the Regulatory Decisions Committee (RDC) of the Financial Services Authority (FSA) refusing to revoke or vary a prohibition order imposed on him by the FSA in respect of serious regulatory failings. The tribunal acceded to the FSA's application to strike out the reference on the ground that the reference had no conceivable prospect of success.

Cordle and another v Financial Services Authority

Financial services Financial Services Authority (FSA). The Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber) Financial Services upheld a decision of the respondent Financial Services Authority issuing a decision notice to the effect that the applicant's application for approval under of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 would be dismissed on the basis that the applicant was not a fit and proper person due to his dishonesty in a previous investigation and his failure to mention that investigation to the authority on his application form.

*Thommes v Financial Services Authority

Financial services Financial Services Authority (FSA). The Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber) dismissed the reference by a former director of a company, challenging a decision notice by which the Financial Services Authority had informed the director of its decision pursuant to of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, to prohibit him from performing any controlled function involving the exercise of significant influence in relation to any regulated activity carried on by any authorised person, exempt person or exempt professional firm.

*Ollerenshaw and another v Financial Services Authority

Financial services Financial Services Authority (FSA). The Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber) ruled on a reference made to it by O and A, two senior officers of Black and White Group Ltd, which had specialised in arranging mortgages and associated insurance, in circumstances in which they challenged decisions of the Financial Services Authority making prohibition orders against them and imposing financial penalties on them for breach of, inter alia, Principles 1 and 6 of the FSA's Statements of Principles for Approved Persons.

*Mark Anthony Financial Management and another v Financial Services Authority

Financial Services Financial Services Authority (FSA). The Upper Tribunal (Tax and Chancery Chamber) gave reasons for its earlier decision that it was appropriate to impose a penalty of 150,000 on the applicants in circumstances where it had previously found that the applicants had submitted mortgage applications on his own behalf and, as its first applicant trading business on behalf of clients on several occasions and that the applications had contained false and misleading information which the second applicant either had known to be false or misleading or had been reckless as to whether such information had been true and complete.