Source: All England Reporter
Publisher Citation: [2017] All ER (D) 104 (May)
Court: Court of Justice of the European Union (Grand Chamber)

Judges Lenaerts (President), Tizzano (Vice-President), Silva de Lapuerta, Ilešic, da Cruz Vilaça, Juhász, Berger, Prechal and Regan (Presidents of Chambers), Rosas (Rapporteur), Toader, Safjan, Šváby, Jarašiunas and Fernlund

Judgment Dates: 10 May 2017


European Union - Freedom of movement - Persons - Applicant mothers being third-country nationals having primary daily of minor children being of Netherlands nationality - Competent Netherlands authorities refusing applicants' applications for social assistance and child benefit on basis of not having right of residence in that member state - Whether EU law precluding member state from refusing right of residence to third-country national parent responsible for primary daily care of minor child - Whether it could not be excluded that other parent being national of that member state might be able to take charge of primary daily care of child - Whether EU law precluding member state from providing that third-country national parent with primary daily care of child subject to condition that that parent should establish that other parent not in position to provide such care - Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art 20.

The Case

European Union Freedom of movement. The Court of Justice of the European Union gave a preliminary ruling in which it decided, among other things, that art 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union should be interpreted as meaning that for the purposes of assessing whether a child who was a Union citizen would be compelled to leave the territory of the EU as a whole and thereby deprived of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred on him by that article if the child's third-country national parent was refused a right of residence in the member state concerned, the fact that the other parent, who was a Union citizen, was actually able and willing to assume sole responsibility for the primary day-to-day care of the child was a relevant factor, but it was not in itself a sufficient ground for a conclusion that there was not, between the third-country national parent and the child, such a relationship of dependency that the child would indeed be so compelled were there to be such a refusal of a right of residence.

Practice Areas

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