Indemnity Construction of indemnity clause. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, held that the obtaining and receiving of advice after a mistake had been made, even if the mistake could be easily rectified, could not mean that an obligation to correct one's mistake or negligence continued to accrue and give a fresh cause of action every day after the mistake had been made.
Mistake Rectification. Two properties were placed in trust for the benefit of the claimant. Her father loaned her money to purchase one of the properties. The claimant made a settlement by which she would pay the loan back to her father. The solicitor failed to inform her of the negative effects of doing so. On learning of the negative effects, she sought to have the settlement set aside, on the grounds of equitable mistake. Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs Commissioners resisted the application. The Chancery Division held that, applying settled law, it was appropriate for the settlement to be set aside.
European Union Employment. The Court of Justice of the European Union ruled that art 2(1) and (2)(a) and art 6(1) of Council Directive (EC) 2000-78 (establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation) should be interpreted as not precluding national legislation, such as that at issue, which excluded the crediting of periods of school education completed by a civil servant before the age of 18 for the purpose of the grant of pension entitlement and the calculation of the amount of his retirement pension, in so far as that legislation was objectively and reasonably justified by a legitimate aim relating to employment policy and labour-market policy and constituted an appropriate and necessary means of achieving that aim.
Employment Discrimination. The employees were fee-paid members of tribunals. They were not given access to a pension scheme in respect of their service, whereas salaried regional medical members were. They brought a claim before the employment tribunal against the Ministry of Justice. On a preliminary issue, the tribunal determined that the work done by fee-paid medical members and regional medical members was not broadly similar, for the purposes of reg2(4) of the Part-Time Workers (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2000, . The Employment Appeal Tribunal, in dismissing the employees' appeal, held that the employment judge had correctly approached the task of deciding whether the work of the two groups was the same or broadly similar.
Pension Pension scheme. The Chancery Division, in dismissing the claimant's appeal against a decision of a Pensions Ombudsman, rejected a submission that art8 of Council Directive (EEC) 80-987 (relating to the protection of employees in the event of the insolvency of their employer), required the United Kingdom to ensure that every individual employee of every pension scheme received a minimum of 50% of his scheme benefits. The Directive did not have the direct effect of entitling the claimant to that level of protection, or of requiring the national legislation to be construed to produce that result.
Education Teacher. The appellant appealed against a determination by the Deputy Pensions Ombudsman (the DPO), dismissing his complaint against the respondent Department for Education in relation to the recovery of an overpayment of his pension under the Teachers' Pension Scheme. The Chancery Division held, inter alia, that, on the DPO's factual findings, her conclusion that the defence of change of position had been unavailable to the appellant could not be faulted. However, he had had a limitation defence for the recovery of any overpayments which had been made more than six years before the relevant date when the limitation period was to be regarded as having stopped and, to that extent, the appeal would be allowed.
Family proceedings Orders in family proceedings. The mother and father separated following period of cohabitation and one child. An order was made by the court in regard to the level of payments required by the father. The father in due course applied under of the Child Support Act 1991 to the Secretary of State and the Child Maintenance Service for that service to fix the legal level of maintenance. The mother did not accept that reasoning, nor the application of the section to the actual facts and circumstances. As a result, she sought to appeal. She also applied to the court for restoration of the previous order or a top up under s 8 of the 1991 Act. The Family Division held that there was no jurisdiction to make a 'top up' order. However a lump sum payment was ordered to fund her appeal.
Divorce Financial provision. A wife began proceedings for divorce and a financial remedy order. She suspected that her husband had property in Jordan and asked him for disclosure. He denied the allegation and a consent order on financial provision was granted. The wife discovered later that the husband did have property in Jordan. She applied for permission to appeal against a consent order. The Family Division, in allowing the application, held that, whilst non-disclosure did not mean that a consent order previously granted should be set aside, in the present case, there was evidence of potentially significant non-disclosure and the wife's appeal had a realistic prospect of success.
Divorce Appeal. Post divorce, the husband had refused an open offer of settlement from the wife. As a result, the judge in effect dismissed his application for financial remedy. The husband sought permission to appeal and that was refused on the basis that his appeal had no reasonable prospect of success.
Discrimination Employment. The employee appealed against a decision of the employment tribunal, which dismissed his claim of indirect age discrimination. The Employment Appeal Tribunal, in allowing the employee's appeal, determined that the tribunal had erred in law in its approach to the question of 'particular disadvantage' for the purposes of s19(2)(b) of the . Further, it had not given reasons which complied with Meek v City of Birmingham District Council IRLR 250, for its conclusion as to whether the provision, criterion or practice which the employer had applied had been a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim, for the purposes of s19(2)(d) of the Act.