Health and safety at work Employer's duties. The claimant, a jockey, was injured when he fell from his horse during a race at the first defendant company's race track. He brought proceedings, relying largely on reg 4 of the Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1998, , which provided that work equipment was to be so constructed or adapted as to be suitable for the purpose for which it was provided. The judge at first instance dismissed his claim. The Court of Appeal held that on the true construction of the Regulations, the Regulations were to be regarded as giving rise to a form of liability which was a stricter liability than at common law. The judge had been wrong to import the common-law phrase of 'reasonable forseeability' into reg 4 of the Regulations, and to dismiss the claim on the basis that the way in which the claimant had been injured was very unusual and that the defendant could not have been expected to do more to prevent the claimant's injury.
Costs Order for costs. The claimant was an asylum seeker and had also claimed to be a child. The local authority was responsible for assessing the claimant's age. The local authority assessed the claimant as being an adult, and as a result, responsibility for the claimant would pass to the Secretary of State for the Home Department. The Secretary of State decided to disperse the claimant and the claimant sought judicial review of that decision. In January 2013, directions for the hearing were set, but the authority failed to comply with those directions and failed to respond to correspondence from the parties. A few days prior to the substantive hearing, the authority informed the parties that it had re-evaluated its position and was now prepared to regard the claimant as a child. The terms of the agreement were agreed and approved by the court but matters pertaining to costs were contested. The Administrative Court decided that the authority should be liable for costs incurred from after the date when directions were set.
Injunction Breach of covenant. The defendants were trustees over land on which they had established a mosque. The local authority served an enforcement notice for breach of planning control and the defendants had appealed. During the appeal hearing, the defendants entered into a unilateral deed whereby they covenanted to: (i) submit a valid planning application for development of the land, and (ii) remove the buildings from the land should they fail to comply with the requirement to submit a valid planning application. The defendants failed to submit a valid planning application and the authority sought an injunction ordering specific performance of the covenant to remove the buildings from the land. The High Court allowed the application and ordered specific performance.
Highway Definitive map. The claimants applied for modification orders pursuant to s53(5) of the . The defendant local authority rejected the applications as the maps provided did not comply with para1(a) of Sch 14 to the Act. The claimants applied for judicial review and the judge upheld the authority's decision. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, allowed the claimant's appeal as a map which was produced to a scale of 1:25,000, even if it was digitally derived from an original map with a scale of 1:50,000, satisfied the requirements of para1(a) of Sch 14 to the Act.
Health and safety at work Employer's duties. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division allowed an appeal in a workplace personal injury claim brought by crane drivers employed by the defendant employer. The claimants contended, inter alia, that they had suffered back pain as a result of the position which they had had to adopt in their cabs. The court had that the judge had erred in finding that the claimants' rejection of a proposal to install joystick controls in the cranes had broken the chain of causation. The matter was remitted to the judge for him to decide whether there had been a breach of reg17(2) of theProvision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1998.
Family proceedings Orders in family proceedings. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, held that a judge had erred in granting a father less restrictive and unsupervised contact with his daughter in circumstances where the judge had recognised that a psychological risk assessment had been required of the father in order to assess any potential risks to the child of him having unsupervised contact.
Water and watercourses Flooding. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, in dismissing the appeal of the Environment Agency, upheld a finding that it failed properly to interpret, apply or have regard to its own policy when it classified sluices on the Manchester Ship Canal as 'formal' flood defences on the ground that their 'primary' purpose was flood prevention, with the effect that land, which was owned and proposed for development by the claimants, had been at a higher risk of flooding. The sluices were an integral part of the canal, serving a dual purpose of providing flood defences and navigational purposes for the canal, but the defendant had not been entitled, applying its own policies which distinguished between 'primary' purposes and 'secondary' purposes of flood defences, to find that, by having a dual purpose, the sluices had had dual 'primary' purposes.
Local Government Council tax. In February 2012, the Valuation Tribunal determined that the appellants were responsible for council tax in respect of a property in relation to which they were the registered owners. The respondent's case was that the premises were in multiple occupation and that council tax was payable by the registered owners. The appellants' case was that, throughout the relevant period, the whole of the premises were let to bona fide tenants and accordingly it was those tenants who were responsible for council tax. The appellants relied upon documentation including copies of tenancy agreements. The respondent relied on evidence which cast doubt upon the genuineness of the tenancy agreements. The tribunal concluded that, during the period, the premises were in multiple occupation and that accordingly, the appellants were responsible for paying the council tax due for the period. The appellants appealed. The Administrative Court, in dismissing the appeal, held that tribunal had been entitled to conclude that it was not satisfied that the agreements were genuine in the face of the evidence which tended to prove the contrary.
Housing Homeless persons. The claimant had applied for housing assistance from the defendant local authority. He had learning difficulties, so his brother assisted him with day-to-day tasks. His brother would have applied for housing assistance also, but was ineligible due to his immigration status at that time. The authority decided that the claimant was eligible for housing assistance and was unintentionally homeless, but he was not in priority need under s189(1)(c) of the because he received assistance from his brother and, in a homeless situation, he would not suffer injury or detriment or be less able to fend for himself than would the ordinary street homeless person. The claimant's appeal to the county court was dismissed. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, also dismissed the appeal on the ground that the judge had made no error of law. In interpreting the provision of s189(1) of the Act, consideration was given to R v Camden London Borough, ex p Pereira ((1998) 31 HLR 317) and to Osmani v Camden London Borough Council ().
Road Traffic Offence. Following a collision on the M1 motorway, the appellant provided a positive roadside breath test and was taken to the police station where he was unable to provide a second breath test. He was asked to provide a specimen of blood which, on analysis, was found to contain over the legal limit of alcohol and was subsequently convicted of drink driving. The district judge concluded that it had been a reasonable inference by the police from the evidence that the appellant had not been able to provide a breath test due to the accident, that that could amount to a medical reason and that the police had had reasonable cause to believe that. Accordingly, the police had been entitled to require a specimen of blood or urine. The appellant appealed by way of case stated against his conviction. The Divisional Court, in dismissing the appeal, held that, on the evidence, the inference drawn by the district judge that the police officer had had reasonable cause to believe that the appellant's inability to provide a specimen had been for a medical reason had been one open to him.