*SM (Algeria) v Entry Clearance Officer, UK Visa Section

European Union Freedom of movement. Three questions would be referred to the Court of Justice of the European Union in respect of the status of a child who was under the permanent legal guardianship of a European Union citizen or citizens, under 'kefalah' having regard to the transposition of Parliament and in to national law. The Supreme Court further determined that it had jurisdiction to hear the case.

Bundesrepublik Deutschland v Hasan

European Union Immigration. In proceedings between Germany and the respondent Syrian national concerning the German immigration authorities' rejection of the respondent's asylum application and the consequent order for his transfer to Italy, the Court of Justice of the European Union made a preliminary ruling concerning the interpretation of certain provisions of . The Court held, among other things, that art 24(3), of that regulation should be interpreted as meaning that the fact that an appeal procedure brought against a decision that had rejected a first application for international protection made in a member state was still pending was not to be regarded as equivalent to the lodging of a new application for international protection in that member state, as referred to in that provision.

R (on the application of Shote) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Immigration Detention. The claimant's immigration detention between 30 March and 2 May 2017 had not been unlawful on the basis that the defendant Secretary of State should not have exercised her power of immigration detention because it was apparent she would not be able to effect removal within a reasonable time. Accordingly, the Administrative Court dismissed the claimant's application for judicial review of the legality of her immigration detention.

Re E

European Union Immigration. Article 25(2) of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement should be interpreted as meaning that it was open to the contracting state which intended to issue a return decision accompanied by a ban on entry and stay in the Schengen Area to a third-country national who held a valid residence permit issued by another contracting state to initiate the consultation procedure laid down in that provision even before the issue of the return decision. That procedure should, in any event, be initiated as soon as such a decision had been issued. The Court of Justice of the European Union so held in a preliminary ruling in proceedings concerning a Nigerian national in connection with the Finnish National Immigration Service's decision to return E to his home country and to ban him from entering the Schengen Area.

R (on the application of Gureckis) v Secretary of State for the Home Department; R (on the application of Cielecki) v Secretary of State for the Home Department; R (on the application of Perlinski) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

European Union Freedom of movement. The linked claims for judicial review of the three claimants had been selected as test cases in which to consider the lawfulness of the defendant Secretary of State for the Home Department's policy, and its application, to European Economic Area (EEA) nationals found sleeping rough in the UK. The Queen's Bench Division, in granting the claims for judicial review, held, amongst other things, that the policy was unlawful because to treat rough sleeping as an abuse of the right to freedom of movement and residence, as the defendant had done, was contrary to EU law.

Lounes v Secretary of State for the Home Department

European Union Freedom of movement. A citizen of the European Union who: (i) had exercised his freedom of movement by moving to and residing in a member state other than that of which he was a national, under or of Directive (EC) 2004-38; (ii) had then acquired the nationality of that member state, while also retaining his nationality of origin; and (iii) several years later, had married a third-country national with whom he continued to reside in that member state, that third-country national did not have a derived right of residence in the member state in question on the basis of that directive. However, the Court of Justice of the European Union held that such a third-country national was eligible for a derived right of residence under art 21(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

Khan v Secretary of State for the Home Department (AIRE Centre intervening)

Immigration Appeals. Sala (EFMs: Right of Appeal) (), which provided that any challenge to the refusal to issue a residence card had to be by way of judicial review, had been wrongly decided and such decisions could be appealed in the ordinary way to the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (the FTT). Accordingly, the Court of Appeal, Civil Division, allowed the appellant Pakistani national's appeal against the decision of the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber), ruling that the FTT had lacked jurisdiction to hear his appeal.

*Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v Gubeladze

European Union Immigration. The word 'reside' in art 17(1)(a) of the Citizens Directive meant 'legally reside' and the Accession (Immigration and Worker Registration) (Amendment) Regulations 2009, were disproportionate and contrary to EU law. So the Court of Appeal, Civil Division held in dismissing an appeal by the Secretary of State from a decision of the Upper Tribunal (Administrative Appeals Chamber) in relation to a claim for state pension credit under of the State Pension Credit Act 2002.

R (on the application of Decker) v Secretary of State for the Home Department and another

Immigration Appeal. In refusing the appellant an EEA card neither the Secretary of State or the First Tier Tribunal (Asylum and Immigration Chamber) had had regard to reg 21 of the Immigration (EEA) Regulations 2006. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division held that given that the matter was one of public policy, it was necessary to have had regard to that regulation and the failure to have done so was an error of law.

R (on the application of AT) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Immigration Leave to remain. Although Appendix AR of the Immigration Rules, replacing appeals with administrative review, was wrongly drafted, it would be given effect in domestic violence claims that were not also human rights claims, but it could not be read as overriding provisions conferring a right of appeal in a domestic violence case that was also a human rights claim. The Administrative Court further held that the defendant Secretary of State's refusal of the claimant Pakistani national's application for indefinite leave to remain based on domestic violence had been reached by an unfair process.