Company - Administration - Client funds - Company providing services for clients wishing to invest in securities - Client money paid into company's accounts with intention to segregate - Company failing to identify and aggregate client money - Interpretation of relevant provisions in Client Assets Sourcebook (CASS) issued by Financial services Authority - Four relevant issues appealed to Court of Appeal - Appeal to Supreme Court proceeding in respect of three issues - Whether statutory trust created - Whether participation in notional client money pool dependent on actual segregation of client money - Whether primary pooling arrangements applying to client money held in house accounts - - CASS 7, 7.7.2R, 7.9.7R. . In proceedings concerning the administration of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) (LBIE), the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Court of Appeal in relation to three issues involving the constitution of a client money fund for clients (whose money should have been segregated by LBIE from its own accounts into separate client money accounts) in the course of which it interpreted Ch 7 of the Client Asset Sourcebook (CASS 7), issued by the Financial Services Authority pursuant to of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.
Criminal evidence Disclosure of evidence. The Supreme Court held that, the applicable test to determine whether non-disclosure of information by the Crown had breached the right to a fair trial under art6 of the European Convention on Human Rights was that laid down in McInnes v HM Advocate (Scotland) and that, applying that test, there had been a miscarriage of justice at the defendant's trial for the murder of his wife where the Crown had failed to disclose evidence which might have materially weakened the Crown case as presented at the trial.
Charging order Judgment debt. Court of Appeal, Civil Division: The court ruled that the legislative policy underlying s346(1) of the was that a creditor who had issued execution against the land of a person who was adjudged bankrupt was not entitled, as against the trustee in bankruptcy, to retain the benefit of that execution unless the execution was completed before the commencement of the bankruptcy; that was to say, unless the execution was completed before the bankruptcy order was made.
Ordinary possession of land was 'adverse possession' so far as the person out of possession and the were concerned. The focus was not on the nature of the possession but on the capacity of the person in possession. Accordingly where, as in the instant case, a mortgagee had remained in exclusive possession of the mortgaged property for more than 12 years after the limitation period began to run, he was in 'adverse possession' of it for the purposes of the 1980 Act.
*JP Morgan Fleming Claverhouse Investment Trust plc and another v Commissioners of HM Revenue and Customs (Case C-363/05)