Employment Duty of servant. The Supreme Court, in dismissing the claimant companies' appeal, held that a former employee could not be liable for breach of confidence in circumstances where she had not ever acquired the confidential information in question, whether during the time of her employment or afterwards, and had been unaware that the relevant product had been developed using the companies' trade secrets.
Contempt of court Appeal. The appellant father was convicted of contempt of court for acting in breach of undertakings given to the court. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, dismissed his appeal as the evidence before the court had been more than sufficient to prove the alleged contempt.
Patent Petition for revocation. Novartis held two patents in respect of the use of a medical substance (use patents), such substance also protected by a patent and supplementary protection certificate. Hospira wished to market a generic version of the substance, so commenced revocation proceedings in respect of Novartis' use patents. The judge found the use patents invalid. Novartis sought permission to appeal and applied for an interim injunction pending appeal. It was granted permission, but denied the injunction. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, allowed Novartis' appeal, finding that the judge had erred in distinguishing between the situation pending trial and that pending appeal. The Court granted Novartis an interim injunction.
Health and safety at work Employer's duties. The claimant, a jockey, was injured when he fell from his horse during a race at the first defendant company's race track. He brought proceedings, relying largely on reg 4 of the Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1998, , which provided that work equipment was to be so constructed or adapted as to be suitable for the purpose for which it was provided. The judge at first instance dismissed his claim. The Court of Appeal held that on the true construction of the Regulations, the Regulations were to be regarded as giving rise to a form of liability which was a stricter liability than at common law. The judge had been wrong to import the common-law phrase of 'reasonable forseeability' into reg 4 of the Regulations, and to dismiss the claim on the basis that the way in which the claimant had been injured was very unusual and that the defendant could not have been expected to do more to prevent the claimant's injury.
Natural justice Hearing. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, held that a judge had been wrong to find that there had been a breach of natural justice in the instant case and that breach had been waived. The breach, as found by the judge, had resulted from a lay member of a panel of the defendant professional body's disciplinary tribunal making himself absent for a period of the hearing during which oral evidence was being given, and returning to the panel after reading the transcript of the evidence that had been given in his absence. That procedure had been agreed to by the parties in advance; that agreement having the effect that there had been no breach of natural justice and accordingly no waiver. Therefore, the judge's decision dismissing the claimant's challenge against the tribunal's decision was upheld on different grounds.
Immigration Appeal. The appellant's deportation as a foreign criminal had been ordered by the Secretary of State. The Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) determined that, on balance, the circumstances were in favour of his deportation. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, held that, where foreign criminals who were potentially to be deported in accordance with the Borders Act 2007 raised claims under art8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, sought to resist deportation by relying on the interests of a child having British citizenship, insufficient attention had been paid to the weight to be attached, in virtue of its origin in primary legislation, to the policy of deporting foreign criminals. In the circumstances, the appellant's appeal would be dismissed.
Practice Family proceedings. During the course of divorce proceedings, the wife made a general application for enforcement subsequent to a court order which had required the husband to pay financial relief. In response to that application, the husband provided evidence and statements as to his financial means. The wife went on to issue a judgment summons under the . The judge would not allow her to rely upon the evidence and statements which the husband had earlier produced in the Debtors Act proceedings on the ground that they had been obtained under compulsion. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, dismissed the wife's appeal and held that it was not permissible to rely at the hearing of a judgment summons upon any statement made by the debtor in response to legitimate orders made in prior or contemporaneous proceedings resulting from a general enforcement application.
Judicial Review Application for judicial review. The claimant was a British national who had been convicted of trafficking narcotics in Indonesia and sentenced to death by firing squad. She applied for judicial review of the defendant Secretary of State's policy not to fund legal representation for British nationals facing the death penalty abroad. The Divisional Court dismissed the claimant's application and she appealed. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, dismissed the appeal, holding that the claimant was not within the scope of European Union law or the European Convention on Human Rights and that the policy was not irrational.
Company Administration order. A Jersey registered company found itself in an insolvency situation, HSBC bank having called in loans and interest due. The company's main assets were properties in England. The parties agreed that the best solution would be an administration order. However, such a course of action was not available in Jersey. The parties agreed to ask the Royal Court of Jersey for assistance. The Royal Court sent a letter of request to the High Court asking for its assistance. The bank applied for an administration order. The judge refused the application on the ground that he did not have jurisdiction under s426 of the . The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, concluded that the judge had erred in his interpretation of s426(4) and made an administration order.
Limitation of action Accrual of cause of action. The claimants issued proceedings against the defendant for negligent property valuations. The judge dismissed the defendant's application for summary judgment or strike out of the claim. The defendant appealed on the basis that the claim was statute-barred. The Queen's Bench Division, in allowing the appeal, held that the claimants had acquired the requisite knowledge to issue proceedings and could not begin to justify the period of two years during which they apparently did nothing.