Limitation of Action Personal injury claim. The claimant had been a dockworker between 1947 and 1967 and was subsequently diagnosed in 2002 with lung cancer. He alleged that, during the course of that work, he had been exposed to asbestos and, in 2009, issued proceedings against the defendants for damages for negligence or breach of duty, claiming that there was a connection between the cancer and his exposure to asbestos. The defendants claimed that the action was barred by the . The Queen's Bench Division, in dismissing the claim held that it would refuse to exercise the power under s33 of the Act to extend time and accordingly, the defendants' limitation defence would succeed.
Particulars of claim Amendment. The claimant was owner of two warehouses which had been built by the defendant, with some of the work having been sub-contracted to a third party. The claimant was dissatisfied with the work carried out by the sub-contractor and issued proceedings against the defendant shortly before the limitation period expired. The claimant subsequently sought to amend its particulars of claim after the limitation period had ended. The judge permitted such a change, finding that the claim sought to be introduced in the amendment had not sought to introduce a new cause of action. The defendant and sub-contractor appealed. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, allowed the appeal, finding that the amended claim had sought to assert a new cause of action.
Practice Summary judgment. The Chancery Division dismissed the defendants' applications for summary judgment, in circumstances where the substantial factual and documentary evidence and matters which were in dispute made the summary judgment procedure inappropriate. Further, subject to further discussion, the court allowed the claimant's application to strike out the majority of a witness statement made on behalf of the second to fourth defendants by a current director, in circumstances where, inter alia, the director would not be allowed at trial to give oral evidence which merely recited the relevant events, of which he did not have direct knowledge, by reference to documents he had read.
Beijing Jianlong Heavy Industry Group v Golden Ocean Group Ltd and another company; Beijing Jianlong Heavy Industry Group v Ship Finance International Ltd and another company
Shipping Charterparty. The Commercial Court considered applications in which it was alleged that the claimant company had repudiated its obligations under certain charterparties. The court held, applying the principle in Foster V Driscoll , that the views of the arbitrators had been correct, and that, contrary to the claimant company's submissions, the guarantees in the case were enforceable as a matter of English public policy.
Tael One Partners Ltd (acting in its capacity as general partner of The Asian Entrepreneur Legacy One LP) v Morgan Stanley & Co International plc
Contract Construction. In earlier proceedings the Commercial Court ordered summary judgment, awarding the claimant US$615,597 on the ground that a payment premium was payable by the defendant on repayment of the loan as condition 11.9(a) of the Loan Market Association terms for par trade transactions (the LMA terms) conferred an extra right to sums which had not accrued by the settlement date. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, in allowing the defendant's appeal held that, on the true construction of the LMA terms, the claimant was not entitled to claim the payment premium as the sums had not accrued at the settlement date and there was no extra entitlement beyond what was said to be payable in the LMA terms. Accordingly, the judge's order was set aside and the claimant's claim was dismissed.
Agricultural holding Arbitration. The Chancery Division dismissed the claimant's claim and refused to set aside an arbitration award pursuant to s68 of the . The court rejected the principle ground of appeal, namely that the arbitrator's reasoning had been inadequate.
Sentence Notification and orders. The claimant had been convicted of sexual offences and given an extended sentence which, when aggregated, meant that upon release he would be subject to notification requirements for an indefinite period. If his custodial sentence only was taken into account, the notification requirements would last only ten years. The defendant Chief Constable decided that the indefinite period was the applicable one as the custodial sentence and extension were to be aggregated. The claimant's application for judicial review of that decision was dismissed. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, held that the definition of 'custodial sentence' in s76 of the informed the meaning of 'sentenced ... to imprisonment for a term of 30 months or more' as contained in s82 of the . Consequently, the indefinite notification requirements did apply to the claimant and did not constitute a breach of his rights under arts8 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
Adoption Order. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, held that it was legally permissible for a local authority to present a case to its adoption panel and issue an application for a placement for adoption order in circumstances where the child was not subject to an interim care order but was simply accommodated under s20 of the .
Land Interest in land. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, held that a judge had erred in finding that the payment by the defendant and his wife of money to the claimant for the purposes of making a deposit of a property had not given rise to a beneficial interest in the property. It had been clear from the evidence that the defendant and his wife had intended, at some later stage, to purchase the property from the claimant, and the only intention that could have been drawn from the evidence had been that the defendant and his wife would have expected the sums paid to the claimant to have been taken into account on that hypothetical purchase.
Conflict of laws Foreign law. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, upheld a decision that the claimant had no beneficial interest in property purchased by his wife and transferred to the first defendant company. The claimant had not been entitled to rely on Russian law as that of the matrimonial domicile to establish an interest in money used to purchase the property and then seek to apply English domestic law to follow that interest through to the purchased property. The application of Russian law as that of the matrimonial domicile, under English conflict of law rules, had to be carried through to all stages of the relevant history, and, on the application of Russian law, the claim had to fail.