Sentence Imprisonment. The defendant had been sentenced to a total of 10 months' imprisonment for two counts of fraud in which the defendant had fraudulently obtained her sister's 2300 share in a life insurance policy and had taken out a credit card in the sister's name accruing repayments of over 6000. The Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, in allowing the appeal accepted that the relevant sentencing guidelines used to impose the sentence had been applied erroneously and that the starting point had been far too high. Accordingly, the defendant's sentence was quashed and substituted with a total sentence of four months' imprisonment.
Sentence Imprisonment. The defendant had been sentenced to an indeterminate term of imprisonment for public protection (IPP) following a plea of guilty to one count of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm. Following fresh medical evidence which showed that the defendant suffered a mental condition that amounted to a psychopathic disorder under the the Court of Appeal, Criminal Division allowed the defendant's appeal and substituted the IPP sentence with a hospital order and restriction order pursuant to ss37 and 41 of the Act, respectively.
Sentence Imprisonment. The Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, allowed a defendant's appeal against an indeterminate sentence for public protection (IPP) following pleading guilty to one count of wounding with intent. The IPP sentence was considered neither proportionate nor necessary in the circumstances of the case and was substituted with an extended sentence of 11 years, with a custodial period of 6 years and an extended period of 5 years.
Sentence Imprisonment. The defendant doctor had pleaded guilty to manslaughter after what had been described as an appalling and gross breach of duty resulted in the defendant failing to recognise and deal with the deceased's symptoms of diabetes which resulted in the deceased dying due to diabetic ketoacidosis. The Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, dismissed the defendant's appeal against sentence and held that the sentence of two and a half years' imprisonment he had received had not been manifestly excessive.
Sentence Imprisonment. The defendant had pleaded guilty to two counts of assault occasioning actual bodily harm in circumstances where she had carried out a sustained attack on two victims in their home. She had received a total sentence of 16 months' imprisonment. The Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, dismissed her appeal against sentence holding that the sentence had not been manifestly excessive and there had been nothing in the case to justify a suspended sentence.
Sentence Imprisonment. The Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, dismissed a defendant's appeal against the imposition of a seven month imprisonment sentence for one count of affray which had involved a street brawl where the defendant had caused another to lapse into unconsciousness. The sentence imposed was held to have been neither manifestly excessive nor wrong in principle.
Sentence Imprisonment. The defendant had been sentenced to eight years' imprisonment after being convicted of one count of encouraging or assisting the commission of an offence, namely supplying heroin, believing it would be committed contrary to s45 of the . The Court of Appeal, Criminal Division, allowed the defendant's appeal against sentence after it held that the sentencing remarks had given no indication as to whether and to what extent the defendant's personal mitigation points had been taken into account when the sentence had been passed. The sentence was reduced to one of six years' imprisonment.
Libel and slander Defamatory words. The defendant businessman was interviewed for a television broadcast which was also published in a website article in a longer version. The claimant Member of Parliament for North Somerset and former Secretary of State for Defence issued defamation proceedings against the defendant with respect to the publications. The master ordered meaning to be tried as a preliminary issue. The Queen's Bench Division held that the extracts in the broadcast would not convey a defamatory meaning. However, the extended version in the website article bore a defamatory meaning on its ordinary and natural, and innuendo meaning.
Proceeds of crime Restraint order. The claimant was charged with fraud. He was made the subject of an order under the which did not provide for provision of legal expenses. The claimant was later charged with offences pre-dating the 2002 Act and so was made the subject of a restraint order under the . The 1988 Act did allow for the provision of legal expenses. The claimant had been incurring legal expenses whilst the order under the 2002 Act was in force. When the order under the 1988 Act was made, the claimant's solicitors settled invoices for work done during the currency of the order under the 2002 Act from monies held on behalf of the claimant. The defendant contended that it had been unlawful for the claimant to incur legal expenses relating to his fraud case whilst the order under the 2002 Act had been in force and-or that the legal fees had been improperly incurred. The Administrative Court held that: (i) the order did not prevent a person subject to a restraint order from incurring fresh liabilities; and (ii) there was no evidence to support a contention that there had been any impropriety in relation to the claimant's legal fees.
Libel and slander Publication. The claimant was a former high profile Conservative party politician. The defendant was a well-known public figure with a large following on the social networking platform, 'Twitter'. In November 2012, the BBC, through its 'Newsnight' programme had broadcast a report containing a serious allegation of child abuse by a senior Conservative party figure from the same era as when the claimant had been a senior politician. The report was picked up by other media publications but alleged abuser had not been identified by name. Shortly thereafter, however, the defendant published a statement on Twitter which had asked why the claimant's name was 'trending'. Included within the statement were the words 'innocent face'. The claimant took the view that the statement was defamatory and issued libel proceedings. The matter came before the Queen's Bench Division for the meaning of the words to be tried as a preliminary issue. The Queen's Bench Division held that the ordinary and natural meaning of the words, or in the alternative, the innuendo meaning of the words, were defamatory bearing the meaning that the claimant was a paedophile guilty of sexually abusing boys living in care.