Company Winding-up. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, upheld a decision that, upon a company being placed into members' voluntary liquidation, once contingent claims had been admitted to proof, the liquidators had no alternative but to proceed to value those contingent claims under r4.182A of the Insolvency Rules 1986, , and then to distribute the net assets to the members after satisfying the creditors in the amount of the valuations. There was no legal duty on a liquidator who had already valued contingent claims and had admitted them to proof in the amount of the valuation to provide for the contingency in full by making a reserve against any distribution to members of the company.
Estoppel Company. The third defendant, S, was induced by the first defendant, A, to make payments to A's wife and a business he controlled, in respect of building work carried out by the claimant company, of which A was a director. A and his wife kept hold of the money. S sought to claim that the claimant was estopped from claiming the cost of the work from him, as the payments he had made discharged any liability he had for the building work. The Chancery Division held that S was unable to establish the necessary reliance to found the estoppel which he claimed.
Company Director. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, held that findings against the ninth and tenth defendants, who had been director and senior employee of a company that had become insolvent following a fraud committed by members of the company by a sham hedge fund arrangement, had been justified on the evidence.
Insurance Contract of insurance. The Supreme Court dismissed the appellant businesses' appeal against a finding that their extended warranty agreements in respect of electrical equipment had fallen within a class of general insurance contracts as defined in the (Regulated Activities) Order 2001, . Further, the insurance business classes in the Annex to the First Council Directive (EEC) 73-239 (on the co-ordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the taking-up and pursuit of the business of direct insurance other than life assurance) could not have been intended to limit the freedom of member states to regulate other categories of business. Accordingly, the winding up orders made against the appellants by the Financial Services Authority had been valid.
Financial Services Financial Services Authority. The claimant Financial Services Authority issued proceedings against the defendants alleging that the 'land-banking' schemes established and operated by the first and third defendant companies were collective investment schemes (CISs) within the definition in s235 of the and that the defendants had done so in breach of ss19 and 21 of the Act. The Chancery Division held that the schemes had been CISs and that the first and third defendants had acted in breach of ss19 and 21 of the Act.
Solicitor Duty. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, held that a judge, in deciding certain preliminary issues in a bank's claim against the defendant firm of solicitors for breach of trust in connection with a re-mortgage transaction, had been entitled to find that the solicitors had acted in breach of trust in failing to use the claimant's advance to fully discharge the prior charge on the property, but had erred in finding that the breach was limited to the amount of the shortfall which would have been necessary to fully discharge the prior charge.
Appeal Leave. The claimant loan company obtained judgment against the defendant when he defaulted on repayments. The defendant sought permission to appeal out of time. The Mercantile Court of the Queen's Bench Division held that permission would be granted.
Company Director. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, held that a judge had erred in construing an agreement for the sale of a company as not giving the defendant the right to require the claimants to cease to be non-executive directors of the company.
Insurance Indemnity insurance. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, held that a judge had been wrong to find that the defendant insurer's liability to the claimant insured under an employer's liability policy had restricted the indemnity that the claimant could claim under the policy for damages paid to an employee who had contracted mesothelioma by proportioning the period of the employee's period of work with the claimant to the period under which the claimant had been insured with the defendant. If an employer was liable to his employee for his employee's mesothelioma following a tortious exposure to asbestos created during an insurance period, then, for the purposes of the insuring clause in the employer's liability policy, the disease was 'caused' within the insurance period.
Conflict of laws Tort. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal by VTB Capital plc (VTB) by which VTB sought: (i) permission to serve Nutritek International Corp and others (Nutritek) out of the jurisdiction on the basis that the appropriate forum for the resolution of VTB's tort claims against Nutritek was England; and (ii) permission to amend its pleaded case to raise a contractual claim based on piercing the corporate veil. Having considered the relevant legal principles, the Supreme Court decided that the Court of Appeal had been entitled to reach the conclusions it had reached on both those issues.