Building contract Insurance. The defendant construction company was employed, among other things, to create a base for a crane with poured concrete. The crane subsequently collapsed. The claimant ensurers sought a declaration of non liability. The claimant sought, among other things, a declaration that the concrete base was a 'product', and that therefore it was not liable to indemnify the defendant for any liability. The Chancery Division held that none of the terms was a product, individually or together, and that the application for a declaration would be refused.
Landlord and tenant Lease. The claimant was the freehold owner of railway land, including the road bridge (the premises). The defendant was the lessee of the premises. The proceedings concerned a platform which was adjacent to a bridge over a railway. It consisted of the main platform and an infill. An issue arose between the parties as to whether the premises demised under two leases excluded an infill and as to which party should bear the cost of substantial repairs to the infill. The Chancery Division held that on the true construction of the leases, the infill was not part of the premises demised by the leases. The repairs did not fall to be carried out by the defendant
Employment Contract of service. The claimant was the former CEO of the defendant company. On his retirement, he was to be paid a sum under an agreement. An issue arose as to whether PAYE should be deducted from the payment to be made under the agreement. The Chancery Division held that the agreement, properly construed, meant that the sum should be paid to the claimant net of any PAYE due from him as a result of the payment.
Insurance Claim. The Queen's Bench Division, Commercial Court, dismissed the claimant's claim against the defendant insurers for an indemnity and damages arising from a fire. The court found that the defendant had established some of the misrepresentations, non-disclosures and breaches of condition on which it had relied.
Claim form Service. A claim concerning a building contract dispute was struck out on the basis that the claimant had failed to serve particulars of claim within the required 14 days in accordance with CPR 7.4(1)(b). On the claimant's application to set aside that order, the Technology and Construction Court held that a photocopy of a claim form, which was sent by Document Exchange by the claimant's solicitors to the defendants' solicitors, was not the document required for service to be achieved under CPR 6.3. In order to effect proper service by that means, a claim form, as issued and sealed by the court, and as an original document would have had to have been enclosed. Accordingly, the order striking out the claim would be set aside and the claim form was still effective for service.
Insolvency Administration order. On an application by the administrators of MF Global UK Ltd, the Chancery Division, Companies Court, made an order governing the distribution of funds as client money by the administrators. In order to proceed with a distribution of the balance of the available funds, and to ensure the timely return of client money, a process was needed to deal with rejected claims and unknown claims which could provide a degree of certainty and protection.
Hewitson v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government and another; Shepherd v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government and another
Town and Country planning Development. The claimants, S and H, each applied for planning permission for the erection of a single wind turbine on a farm in Cumbria. The second defendant authority failed to determine S's application and refused H's application, subsequent to which S and H appealed to the first defendant Secretary of State. In dismissing the appeals, the inspector concluded in each case that the adverse impacts of the wind turbine would outweigh the benefits. The claimants applied under s288 of the for orders quashing the decisions of the inspector. In dismissing the applications, the Administrative Court held that the inspector had been entitled to determine S's application on the strength of the written representations made without taking into account what had been said during a site visit about the granting of planning permission by the authority for a smaller wind turbine nearby. It had been open to the parties to have written to her to ask for further information to be taken into account. Further, the reasons provided by the inspector had been entirely adequate to enable each claimant to know why the appeal had not succeeded.
R (on the application of Newhaven Port & Properties Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
Commons Registration. The claimant port applied for judicial review of East Sussex County Council's decision to register an area of the claimant's land as a town or village green under s15(4) of the . The judge, inter alia, dismissed the claimant's argument that s15(4) was incompatible with art1 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court of Appeal, Civil Division, dismissed the claimant's appeal, holding that the Secretary of State had demonstrated that s15(4) of the Act pursued a legitimate aim and that the means by which it pursued that aim were not manifestly without reasonable foundation.
Costs Order for costs. In proceedings concerning CPR PD 51G, the Costs Management in Mercantile Courts and Technology and Construction Courts pilot scheme, the Technology and Construction Court held that an application to amend a costs management order should not be entertained after judgment had been given in the case. The defendant could not seek, retrospectively, to revise the costs budget under para 6 of the Practice Direction so as to all but double the original costs budget approved in the costs management order.
Limitation of action When time begins to run. The claimant issued proceedings against the defendants for breach of contract and negligence. The master concluded that, although the claim for breach of contract was statute-barred, it was arguable that a concurrent claim in tort was not. The defendants appealed. The Queen's Bench Division, in allowing the appeal, held that the knowledge defence under of the Limitation Act 1980 was not made out and the claimant's claim would be struck out or the defendants would be granted summary judgment.