The Case

The literal construction of s103(2) was that the right to bring a stoppage appeal did not arise merely and solely because asylum support was stopped. The wording of that section made it clear that the triggering event had to be a decision to stop asylum support, before that support would otherwise have come to an end. The word 'otherwise' was significant since it indicated that a right of appeal for a stoppage appeal only arose if, before the decision under appeal was made, the interested party had a pre-existing right to s95 support which would not otherwise have come to an end. If there was not a pre-existing right to such support before the decision under challenge was made, then there could be no s95 support, which would otherwise have come to an end. It followed that a decision to stop support to an asylum seeker only gave rise to an appeal under s103(2) if before the decision under challenge was made, the claimant already possessed an existing right to s95 support that had been prematurely terminated by the decision under challenge. An asylum seeker could not pursue a stoppage appeal where the Secretary of State made only one decision, granting support for a limited period of time, or support subject to a condition.